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LIBERTARIANISM WITH A TWIST
Heidi Li Feldman*
SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD. By .RichardA. Epstein.

Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1995. Pp. xiv, 361. $35.
INTRODUcTION

Despite its title, Richard Epstein's' latest book is actually quite
intricate. In Simple Rules for a Complex World, Epstein makes the
ostensibly straightforward claim that the American legal system
should consist of only simple rules. Then, Epstein submits a list
that in his opinion fits the bill.
Epstein's position is more complicated than might be suggested
by a casual reading of his recommendations for legal reform.
Neither his definition of simplicity nor the rules he favors is particularly transparent. Furthermore, the scope of Epstein's argument
exceeds the range suggested by the book's explicit aims, which are
"to lay bare some of the foundational difficulties in the modem law
for readers without any specialized legal training and experience,
but with more than a passing interest in the law" (p. ix), and to
establish that "[t]here is too much law and too many lawyers"
(p. ix). In Simple Rules, Epstein goes beyond clarifying current law
and urging that we prune the regulatory state. Ultimately Simple
Rules champions a conservative libertarian policy program.
Epstein argues in three steps for seven substantive "universal
prescriptions" (p. 22) that would create a libertarian legal regime. 2
First, he maintains that simplicity should be the measure of merit
for legal rules. Next, he defines simplicity in utilitarian terms. Finally, Epstein claims that a legal regime consisting of his seven proposed rules would be simpler -

in his sense of the term

-

than the

current American legal system.
In this review, I focus primarily on the second two steps Epstein
takes. The first seems to me to require less attention because, as
Epstein's argument amply demonstrates, debating the virtue of simplicity in a legal system turns on what is meant by "simple."
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1986, Brown University; J.D.
1990, Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1993, University of Michigan. - Ed. Thanks to participants in a
Michigan faculty works-in-progress workshop for their comments on an early draft of this
review essay. Thanks also to Lucy Clark for excellent research assistance.
1. James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
2. See infra text accompanying note 6.

1883

1884

Michigan Law Review
I.

[Vol. 94:1883

EPSTEIN'S CONCEPTION OF SIMPLICITY

"My purpose in this book," Epstein tells us, "is to develop a set
of simple rules capable of handling the most complex set of social
relations imaginable, whether in the United States or anywhere
else" (p. 21). With this goal, Epstein must invoke a criterion of
simplicity. He stipulates that "the cheaper the cost of compliance,
the simpler [a] rule is" (p. 25). This conception of simplicity is both
more idiosyncratic and less clear than it initially may seem.
The Epstein simplicity criterion for rules is unusual in its deviation from other common understandings of what it is for a rule or
law to be simple. For example, many people would consider a legal
rule simple to the extent that ordinary citizens can comprehend it
and can anticipate how police and courts would apply it. On this
view, a simple rule has a plain meaning, accessible to courts, police,
and citizens. Another view of simplicity in rules derives from science and mathematics. Within this tradition simplicity is a matter
of brevity and elegance: a rule or law is simple if it can be stated
concisely, without caveats or qualifications. Notice that a rule that
is simple in this sense may not be simple in the plain-meaning sense.
Using terms of art - or, more pejoratively, jargon - may make it
easier to formulate a succinct rule but also may make that rule's
meaning fairly inaccessible to many whom it affects. By the same
token, legal rules that fulfill either the plain-meaning or the brevity
criterion for simplicity may not meet Epstein's utilitarian criterion.
It may be expensive to comply with an easily understood rule or
with a concisely stated one. The costs of compliance depend on the
content of a rule. Epstein is not unaware of this, and he eventually
proposes a set of substantive rules that he claims meet his particular
criterion of simplicity. Before we consider these rules, though,
Epstein's conception of simplicity merits further investigation.
Epstein's conception builds a certain kind of utilitarianism into
the very definition of simplicity. He intends his utilitarian simplicity criterion to measure the comparative worth of the current
American legal regime against any proposed change:
Relative to the state of nature, any system of laws is complex; so the
theme of simplicity would have no independent or normative appeal.
Instead, the preference would be for rules that self-consciously maximize human happiness or welfare. Today, however, we are as far removed from the state of nature as can be imagined. Relative to the
world as it now operates, simplicity becomes a useful test for deciding
whether or not a proposed legal reform will improve human welfare,
even if no set of incremental changes could maximize it. [p. 30]
Note that Epstein does not propose to use his test of simplicity to
arrive at the absolutely superior welfare-maximizing regime, or at
one such regime if more than one could achieve this epitome.
Rather he starts from the position that the current legal regime fails
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to maximize welfare - compared to the state of nature - and proposes that we test any alternative by determining whether it produces overall higher welfare. Even if we were to agree with Epstein
that current American law does not create the best of all welfaremaximizing worlds, it is extremely difficult3 to make the sort of comparative judgments called for by his test.
Epstein assumes the welfare-maximizing inferiority of any system of state regulation compared to life in the state of nature: "The
most simple social organization [is] lawlessness" (p. 33; emphasis
added). It is only because we cannot achieve this state that Epstein
opts to argue for second-best. Yet, Epstein's initial assumption is
rather odd. Certainly at least since Hobbes, theorists have recognized that the problem with the state of nature is precisely that it
diminishes human happiness. As Hobbes himself famously put it:
[D]uring the time men live without a common Power to keep them all
in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a
warre, as is of every man, against every man....
•.. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the
fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth;
no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by
Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of
the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and
which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent 4death;
And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.
With these remarks, Hobbes eloquently states the welfarist case for
the state of laws rather than the state of nature. I do not know
exactly what Epstein means by "rules that self-consciously maximize human happiness or welfare" (p. 30). Although Hobbes does
not specify the form or content the laws should take, his examples
of the fruits of law suggest that minimalist laws directly requiring
people to maximize utility would not suffice to yield such utilityenhancing benefits as agriculture, industry, navigation, engineering,
geography, history, art, and so forth. These goods are quite sophisticated. Their production necessitates large measures of cooperation and coordination unlikely to materialize without some fairly
specific directives. It is rather implausible to assume that a complex
civil society could be realized merely by legislating that citizens
should do whatever is necessary to maximize overall utility. Aside
from citizens' inability to know which actions would fit the bill, people attempting to comply with such a directive would be thwarted
by coordination problems and transaction costs. Epstein recognizes
that coordination problems present obstacles to utility maximiza3. See infra text accompanying notes 18-21.
4. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 185-86 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Classics 1986)
(1651).
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tion (p. 113). He also acknowledges that legal rules can solve such
problems (pp. 113-27), but he downplays the magnitude of the obstacles that coordination problems present and implies that private
cooperation can overcome many of these problems despite the high
transaction costs generally associated with such efforts (pp. 126,
163-93).
Whatever system of rules would in fact maximize utility,
Epstein, like other libertarians, tends to argue that freely contracting parties will bind themselves to the necessary directives
without much action on the part of the state. This is exactly the
proposition that Hobbes devotes Leviathan to denying. One need
not be an ardent Hobbesian to think it unlikely that contract can
solve all the cooperation and coordination problems that would interfere with achieving a host of modem welfare-enhancing systems.
State-constructed legal structures and regulations make possible the
existence of entities ranging from museums to national parks to corporations. Compliance with the laws that make these things possible may cost more than compliance with "rules that self-consciously
maximize human happiness or welfare" (p. 30). Although perhaps
not: it can be expensive to figure out how to maximize welfare
compared to what it costs to follow a more specific law that makes
no reference - explicit or implicit - to welfare maximization.
Furthermore, it can be costly to develop private welfare-maximizing agreements as opposed to implementing state regulations that
accomplish the same ends.
II. CosTs OF "SIMPLICITY"
Even if we were to adopt Epstein's definition of simplicity, he
must clarify the notion of compliance costs. Epstein tends to write
as if the predominant costs of compliance with legal rules consist of
the financial expenses private parties incur trying to abide by stateimposed rules:
[T]he minimum condition for calling any rule complex is that it creates public regulatory obstacles to the achievement of some private
objective....
... In practice, the most ubiquitous legal safety hatch adds three
words to the formal statement of any rule: unless otherwise agreed.
Any rule that explicitly begins with these three words cannot in my
view constitute a complex rule, for those who do not like what it provides will run and hide from its application. [p. 27]
This escapist slant on the costs of rules downplays or overlooks not
only the social costs of rules that too easily can be ignored or set
aside but also the social costs of abandoning rules altogether.
Moreover, Epstein's general suspicion of legal rules seems to distract him from costs entailed even by the rules he ultimately does
endorse. Even privately agreed-upon rules generated through con-
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tractual agreement can be quite dear both in terms of what it costs
the parties to obey and in terms of what it costs the government to
enforce the rules if one party fails to perform. In emphasizing ruleescapism, Epstein seemingly fails to notice that a rule that is inexpensive for a citizen to obey or avoid nonetheless may cost the government much in ensuring compliance.
No matter how we count costs, Epstein himself acknowledges it
often will be unclear whether a rule or system of rules is simple
according to his utilitarian simplicity criterion (pp. 25, 28). Yet he
does not attend to a further problem: the expense of any effort to
ensure that proposed rules pass Epstein's test for simplicity. This
effort requires an analysis of the costs and benefits of the proposed
rules or system of rules. As many torts scholars have noted, performing a cost-benefit analysis can itself be costly.5 It takes resources to gather data on the likely costs of compliance and the
probable benefits of a rule; it requires even more resources to confirm whether hypothesized costs and benefits really materialize.
Even before we can make any of these calculations, we would have
to ascertain how to interpret, apply, and enforce the proposed rules;
otherwise, we could not establish the genuine costs of compliance.
In short, often it will not be simple -

in Epstein's sense -

to apply

the utilitarian simplicity criterion to any given legal rule. Moreover,
assessing simplicity as Epstein defines it will require expertise and
skill in compiling, synthesizing, and analyzing data relevant to measuring the costs and benefits associated with a rule or set of rules, as
well as expertise and skill in anticipating how proposed legal rules
actually will be understood and used. Currently, lawyers often perform these tasks, either in the capacity of adviser to a policymaking
body or in the capacity of advocate before a court. Epstein claims
that a regime of simple rules would reduce the number of lawyers
-

a good thing, in his opinion -

but establishing and maintaining

such a regime would itself seem to demand a sizable number of
lawyers or people similarly, or perhaps more suitably, trained.
III.

EPSTEIN'S NOT-So-SIMPLE RULES

Epstein's own candidates for a complete, simple legal regime
are the following rules:
1. Self-possession: each individual owns herself (pp. 53-59).

2. First-possession: the first person to possess property owns it (pp.
53, 59-63).
3. Exchange by mutual consent: goods and labor may be exchanged
only if all parties to the transaction consent (pp. 53, 71-80).
5. See, ag., GUIDO

CALABREsI, THm CosTs OF ACCIDENTS

28, 256-59, 286-87 (1970).
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4. Keep off or else: if someone aggresses against another's person or
property, the victim is entitled to compensation from the aggressor (pp. 53, 91-92, 101-09).
5. Necessity: when there is imminent peril to life or property, one
person may use another's property; the user ultimately must compensate the owner (pp. 53, 113-16).
6. Take and pay: whenever the government occupies private property or regulates a private owner's use of her property, the government must compensate her for the market value appropriated
unless "the regulation is necessary to prevent the kinds of losses
that neighbors could enjoin" (p. 132) under the keep-off-or-else
rule (pp. 53, 128-40).
7. No redistributive taxation without representation: "if there must

be public redistribution [of wealth], then it must be financed out
of general revenues collected from the same group of individuals
that votes the program into place" (p. 145; pp. 140-48).

Just by noticing the terms embedded in these rules, we can begin to
appreciate the intricacy involved in ascertaining whether Epstein's
rules satisfy the utilitarian simplicity criterion. Terms such as "ownership," "possession," and "market value" may seem clear, but as
corporate lawyers and working economists, among others, know,
when courts, attorneys, and business executives have to apply these
concepts, their meaning often is not so clear after all. Epstein gives
no indication of recognizing this problem, perhaps because he is
confident in how he himself would apply his recommended rules in
the myriad of cases presented by the real world. We have reason to
doubt the ease of the rules' application, however. As Epstein reminds us, he derives some of his rules from the common law (pp.
59, 71, 91). As packed case reporters attest, courts and lawyers
have devoted much effort to figuring out how to interpret and apply
concepts like necessity and aggression againstproperty.6 Such con-

cepts do not speak for themselves. 7

6. For an example of the complexities of interpreting necessity, see Shell Cal. Pipeline Co.
v. City of Compton, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753, 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (noting statutory requirement that public necessity be shown before eminent domain exercised; public necessity to be
construed liberally in favor of condemnor). For an example of how complicated circumstances make it difficult to decide what constitutes aggression, see Commonwealth v. Viar,
425 S.E.2d 86, 89 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing circuit court's grant of motion to suppress
physical evidence seized from home and holding that "knock and announce rule" did not
apply).
7. When used, such concepts blend evaluation and description. Their development responds to both these dimensions. The combination of complex evaluative purpose and descriptive constraint on application can complicate greatly the use of legal blend concepts. For
further discussion of this point, see Heidi Li Feldman, Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92
Mifcff. L. Rav. 1187, 1195-1212 (1994).
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EPSTEIN'S UTILITARIAN LIBERTARIANISM

While the terms of Epstein's rules are not exactly clear, those
familiar with contemporary political philosophy will realize immediately that these rules aim to create a libertarian minimalist state
along the lines suggested by Robert Nozick in his 1974 book Anarchy, State, and Utopia.8 Nozick argues for such a state on grounds
of a preference for the maximal amount of individual liberty for
each person compatible with the same amount of liberty for everybody else. 9 Like Epstein, Nozick defines liberty primarily in terms
of property rights: control over one's own body and whatever other
resources - usually physical goods - over which one can gain possession without force through personal discovery or mutually consensual bargain.' 0 Nozick's argument suffers from some standard
problems with the libertarian position: his conception of liberty has
some serious rivals," and his preference for liberty at the expense
of equality is highly debatable. In Anarchy, State and Utopia,
Nozick devotes little or no argument to defending his conception of
liberty or his strong preference for liberty over equality.12
Although this book has become the standard-bearer for contemporary libertarianism, there is not much in it to persuade those not
already convinced of its basic premises.
While Epstein's libertarian vision suffers from some standard
problems I have not yet discussed, he at least attempts to address
the issues Nozick neglected. Epstein's appeal to utilitarian simplicity provides a vehicle for defending the libertarian conception of
liberty and the libertarian preference for liberty over equality.' 3
Epstein deserves credit for recognizing the need to remedy libertarianism's foundational weaknesses and for making an effort to do
SO.
Marrying utilitarianism and libertarianism allows Epstein to argue that both a property-based conception of liberty and a prefer8. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
9. See id. at ix, 30-35, 113-18.

10. See id. at 10-22.
11. See, eg., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (H.J.

Paton trans., Harper Torchbooks 1964) (characterizing liberty as realization of one's capacities as a rational being); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACr 141, 147-53
(Donald A. Cress ed. & trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1987) (arguing that genuine freedom
is available only in democratic civil society); CmrARLEs TAYLOR, HEGEL AND MODERN SOCIETY 100-18 (1979) (explaining Hegel's view of freedom as achieving self-identity within polit-

ical community).
12. Thomas Nagel makes this point in his insightful review of Nozick's book. See Thomas
Nagel, LIBERTARIANISM WIHoUT FOUNDATIONS, 85 YALE L.J. 136, 137-38 (1975) (reviewing NOZICK, supra note 8), reprinted in THOMAS NAGEL, OTHER MINDS: CRITICAL ESSAYS
1969-1994, at 137, 139 (1995).
13. Nozick himself considered the libertarian minimalist state antithetical to utilitarian-

ism and even to consequentialism more generally. See NoZICK, supra note 8, at 28-30.
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ence for liberty over equality maximize oveiall welfare. If this
argument were successful, it would provide reason to favor libertarianism, assuming one were committed to utilitarianism. As this
twofold counterfactual indicates, however, problems plague the alliance between utilitarianism and libertarianism. It is not at all clear
that libertarianism is in fact utility maximizing. Utility maximization even might require abandoning utilitarianism. As I suggested
before, even if a fully implemented libertarian regime were utility
maximizing, the costs of figuring out whether this were in fact the
case along with the costs of shifting to such a regime might be so
large that it would not be worth it in utilitarian terms. Finally, even
if libertarianism, and its operationalization can be justified on utilitarian grounds, the appeal to utilitarianism saddles libertarianism
with all the usual difficulties of the utilitarian view.
Early in his academic career Epstein championed strict liability
in tort on libertarian principles. 14 He presented his view as a matter
of moral-political justice' 5 and touted strict liability as an alternative to the negligence standard whose defenders often advocate it
using utilitarian arguments of one kind or another. 16 Epstein favored strict liability because he regarded injury inflicted by one
stranger upon another as a kind of wrongful taking: an illicit use of
the victim's person or property. 17 Such "use" violates traditional
libertarian protections of the individual's bodily integrity and right
to total control of one's possessions. In contrast to the position he
adopts in Simple Rules, Epstein's early defense of strict liability
made no appeal to utilitarianism. This was unsurprising because
traditionally libertarianism has elevated personal liberty (of the libertarian variety) above the goal of maximizing utility or welfare. In
other words, traditional libertarians do not accept sacrifices of personal liberty for the sake of increasing overall welfare. This principle lay at the heart of Epstein's objections to a negligence regime in
tort. Because negligence principles allow one person to interfere
with another's person or property when it is cost-efficient or utilitymaximizing to do so, negligence subordinates individual liberty to
social welfare - a strongly antilibertarian outcome.
Epstein has changed his mind. He writes:
Within professional philosophical and economic circles, "utility" has
become the all-purpose placeholder for those goods and consequences that are desired, either by individuals or by collectives. Ac14. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973).
15. See id. at 203-04.
16. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 14-15 (1987) (dem-

onstrating the economic efficiency of a negligence regime under specific assumptions); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29,32-34 (1972) (arguing that the
common law of negligence in fact promotes economic efficiency).
17. See Epstein, supra note 14, at 158-61.
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cordingly the maximization of social utility becomes the objective of a
sound system of legal rules. Although I have from time to time been
of different minds on this proposition, I have now made peace with
myself and believe that these consequentialist theories - that is,
those which look to human happiness - offer the best justificatory
apparatus for demarcating the scope of state power from the area of
individual choice. [p. 30; footnote omitted]
Although Epstein's ambivalence about social welfare as a legal goal
seeps through a bit - he equivocates somewhat between endorsing
maximization of aggregate social welfare and endorsing maximization of as many individuals' welfare as possible - ultimately
Epstein adopts the standard neoclassical aim of maximizing overall
social welfare. He rejects the claim that this position is incoherent
because it demands interpersonal comparisons of individual utility
(p. 141) and justifies a certain form of income redistribution with
reference to its ability to maximize social welfare (pp. 141-42). In
any event, Epstein's endorsement of utilitarianism as the justificatory means for delimiting the scope of state power - and, by the
same token, defining the extent of individual liberty - marks a
radical departure from traditional libertarianism.
V.

EPSTEIN'S DEFENSE OF THE SEVEN RULES

Epstein obscures the significance of this shift in Simple Rules
because the rules he specifies resemble or are identical to those ad-

vanced by traditional libertarians such as Nozick. For Epstein to
defend fully the seven rules he specifies, he must convince us that it
would maximize social welfare to substitute them for the current
legal regime or any other proposed alternative.
This would be a monumental task. It would be unfair to suggest
that in Simple Rules Epstein should have demonstrated conclusively

that his seven rules yield higher social utility than every single alternative regime. Nonetheless, it is fair to expect Epstein to show
rather conclusively that the seven simple rules would promote
greater overall welfare than either the current system or some fairly
obvious alternatives to his own. This Epstein does not do.
Epstein takes an ad hoc approach to comparing the utility of the
current American legal regime with the seven simple rules. For example, consider Epstein's very strong version of the rule of exchange through mutual consent. According to Epstein, genuine
consent obtains even when a bargain has been achieved by use of
extreme economic pressure, when one party is exploited by the bargain, or when the bargain transforms into a market commodity a
good that social, moral, or political norms generally resist treating
as an item for market consumption (pp. 82-90). This highly libertarian rule of freedom of contract is, Epstein claims, superior to any
rule that constrains contracts on any of these grounds. Recall that
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for Epstein superiority in a rule is a matter of simplicity, which is, in
turn, a matter of the social utility or disutility generated by compliance. By this measure, Epstein has to demonstrate that exchange
through mutual consent - construing consent broadly - maximizes social welfare more than either of at least two alternative
rules: exchange through mutual consent - construing consent narrowly - or exchange through mutual consent unless consent either
is extracted under conditions of economic duress or exploitation or
results in unacceptable commodification.
Epstein supplies a bit of anecdotal evidence to support his preferred rule. He asserts that "[tihe exodus in talent from IBM that
led to its 1992 shake-up" (p. 83) illustrates that exploitation is not a
genuine impediment to utility maximization in our society because
businesses do not possess the power to prevent unhappy or undercompensated employees from exiting to a rival employer where
they will be better off. Epstein does not document that there was
an exodus from IBM in the early 1990s, nor that the exodus was due
to the availability of better working conditions elsewhere, nor that
those who left in fact found new, higher utility-yielding jobs, nor
that, even if they did, this made up for any loss of social utility created by the initial exodus. Even if we grant every one of these
claims, one anecdote does not prove a general empirical proposition. What is true in the computer industry is not necessarily true in
other fields. Rather than provide further empirical evidence, however, Epstein suggests a thought experiment to demonstrate that
the bargain between "a perfectly rational employer who possesses
the power to dictate terms" and "a worker [who] has a relatively
lower income" is in fact utility maximizing (p. 83). According to
Epstein, by definition, the employer will offer terms that will maximize its utility, and if the worker accepts them it must be because
she is better off than going without the job - so the bargain also
generates utility for the worker. This thought experiment does not
establish Epstein's general proposition. It does not demonstrate
that government intervention requiring the employer to offer better
terms could not create even more utility. Even if this decreased the
employer's utility somewhat - which it might not - the improvement in terms might increase the worker's utility so greatly that the
net gain in social utility would be greater in this regime than under
the strict libertarian freedom-of-contract rule.
For each proposed rule, Epstein repeats the same strategies to
defend its utilitarian simplicity. Consider Epstein's argument in
favor of his seventh rule, barring redistributive taxation without
representation. As with his other rules, Epstein urges this one on
the basis of its simplicity; that is, its supposed power to maximize
utility better than a rule that would fund redistribution through specialized taxes such as extra taxes on alcohol, cigarettes, or gasoline.
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Presumably Epstein thinks that funding redistribution with these
sorts of taxes leads to the imposition of disutility on those particularly affected by them without producing a sufficient amount of utility elsewhere in the population to outweigh the loss in the taxed
group. There are many problems with this presumption. Most significant, there seems to be at least some empirical counterevidence
to the thesis.
Consider Michigan's shift from funding public schools through
property taxes to funding schools via lottery revenues and various
taxes on goods. In March, 1994, Michigan voters approved Proposal A, a nationally noticed plan to reform the state's property-taxbased educational funding.' 8 A new system based on alternative
revenue sources replaced the property tax, which for almost one
hundred years had provided the prime source of school revenue. 19
Sales and excise taxes and lottery revenues now comprise sixty percent of Michigan's education funding.20 Commentators differ over
whether the new system is fair overall. 2 ' Regardless of equity considerations, the new tax system does seem to cost many individual
Michigan residents less than the old: financial experts maintain that
the plan will save a typical Michigan household about one hundred
dollars per year. This suggests that Proposal A's plan for funding
Michigan public schools passes Epstein's simplicity test understood
most narrowly. Epstein also might argue that the savings to each
resident do not make up for losses of utility elsewhere in the system
due to the shift in the tax base, but that just reveals again the obscurity of Epstein's approach to simplicity. Epstein also might argue
that statewide sales taxes are in fact more general than locally imposed property taxes. In either case, however, the taxes are imposed by the citizens' elected officials and to that extent come from
general revenues. Without further clarification of what constitutes
general revenues, it is hard to know whether Epstein would regard
Michigan sales taxes or local property taxes as more general.
It is obvious that any brief consideration of Michigan's schoolfunding experience is certainly not conclusive as to when and
whether specialized taxes are utility maximizing in comparison to
more general taxes. At minimum, however, the foregoing discus18. See Recent Legislation, Education Law-School Funding-MichiganMoves Toward
Statewide Collection and Distributionof EducationFunds - Mich. Const. art.IX, § 11; Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 388.1620 (West Supp. 1994), 108 HARV. L. REv. 1411 (1995).
19. See Laura Laughlin, State Pursues FairerSchool FundingPlan, Solution to Inequities
Will Test Lawmakers, PHoENix GAzEmTE, Sept. 23, 1994, at Al.
20. See Mark Hornbeck & Charlie Cain, Voters Overwhelmingly Back Sales Tax Increase,
DnmRorr NEws, Mar. 16, 1994, at 1A, 10A, cited in Recent Legislation, supra note 18, at
1413.
21. See Recent Legislation, supranote 18, at 1413-14 (noting that Michigan's new schoolfunding system, although regressive, appears to be in certain respects more equitable than a
property-tax-based approach).
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sion illustrates how very complicated - and expensive - it would
be to ascertain whether the rule against redistributive taxation without representation passes the utilitarian test for simplicity.
By this point, those familiar with debates over utilitarianism and
neoclassical economics will have seen that my objections to
Epstein's arguments are specific versions of well-known general objections to these theories. To corroborate any proposed utilitarian
hypothesis requires a great deal of data. Often the proposers do
not supply this empirical support. Furthermore, simply because
one state of affairs yields a higher degree of utility than another
does not preclude the possibility that a third state of affairs would
yield an even higher degree of utility. One coherently can join in
Epstein's utilitarian objections to any given current American law
or regulation without thereby sharing his conclusion that the libertarian alternative is utility maximizing.
I have criticized two of Epstein's rules by arguing that they are
unlikely to produce greater social utility than current rules or some
other plausible alternatives to present ones. Rather than deploy
similar critiques against each rule Epstein suggests, I turn now to
more schematic problems with his approach.
VI.

EPSTEIN AS A RULE-UTILITARIAN

Arguing on behalf of Epstein, someone might characterize him
as a rule-utilitarian. 22 Although rule-utilitarianism comes in several
variants, the basic motivation underlying this approach is to avoid
some of the problems of a strict act-utilitarianism. According to
traditional act-utilitarianism, conduct is right to the extent that it
maximizes overall utility. As my previous arguments suggest, implementing act-utilitarianism can be very difficult because of the
costs and problems associated with identifying in every instance the
act that indeed will maximize utility. This has led some thinkers to
endorse rule-utilitarianism, according to which an act is right to the
extent it conforms to a rule or set of rules that, if consistently followed, ultimately will promote high levels of overall utility, even if
on some individual occasions following the rule or rules decreases
utility. This indirect method for maximizing utility aims to eliminate the need for the moral agent to decide how to maximize on
each and every occasion, allowing her instead to rely on more general rules - for example, Epstein's "simple" ones.
For a rule-utilitarian regime to work, it must be fairly easy to
understand both the rules and their application. Otherwise, the
drawbacks of act-utilitarianism will resurface: agents will sacrifice
22. Epstein himself does not refer to rule-utilitarianism. I am indebted to Don Regan for

the suggestion that a defender of Epstein's views might look to rule-utilitarianism for
support.
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welfare in their efforts to figure out how to behave in accordance
with the rules and in making mistakes about what the rules require.
Even if the rules are sufficiently accessible, rule-utilitarianism faces
two other chronic problems. First, it is hard to identify which rules
indeed will promote the most overall utility. Second, it is difficult
to keep rule-utilitarianism from collapsing into act-utilitarianism.
Since the point of rule-utilitarianism is to accomplish utility maximization, it would seem that a consistent rule-utilitarian should
permit exceptions to the chosen rules whenever abiding by them
would produce suboptimal results. In Epstein's case, this would
mean selectively deviating from his rules whenever a situation
arises in which nonmandated behavior in fact would improve social
welfare. The tension between rule-utilitarianism's underlying commitment to utility maximization and its surface strategy of rulefollowing suggests that before acting, moral agents should figure
out whether their situations call for exceptional behavior, thereby
undermining the advantageous streamlining of the decisionmaking
process promised by rule-utilitarianism. Moreover, ruleutilitarianism's utilitarian foundation threatens to undo entirely the
distinction between rule and exception. If it is right to behave according to rules that, followed consistently, maximize overall welfare, and general rules do not implement this goal, then it seems the
rule-utilitarian must advocate more particularistic rules with
whatever qualifications and caveats in fact would produce superior
gains in overall welfare. Of course, the more nuanced the rules become, the less streamlined their application can be.
Epstein's proposed legal regime and his strategy for defending it
fit the rule-utilitarian profile: he claims that at least relative to the
current system, following his preferred rules, which make no direct
reference to utility maximization, in fact will increase overall welfare. My earlier arguments show, however, that Epstein's version
suffers from the problems endemic to any variant of ruleutilitarianism. Because of the grand terms of the rules, it is difficult
to know how to interpret and apply them. Understood simplistically, the proposed rules do not appear to be utility maximizing. If
we construe the rules to contain various caveats and qualifications,
they still may not be utility maximizing, and the interpretive efforts
required themselves may decrease utility.
Whatever type of utilitarianism best characterizes Epstein's position, the combination of utilitarianism and libertarianism remains
a peculiar one. Like traditional libertarians, Epstein prefers libertarian liberty to equality of wealth. Unlike traditional libertarians,
Epstein must defend this preference on utilitarian grounds. The experience of Western countries with strong welfare states and high
standards of living suggests that this may be extremely difficult, especially if we factor in the utility-generating capacity of the mere
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fact of equality. If enough people just prefer more equality and less
libertarian liberty, libertarian rules will not be simple rules by
Epstein's own lights. Depending on the facts, the alliance between
libertarianism and utilitarianism has the power completely to undermine libertarianism, all in the name of the utilitarianism that
was to justify it.
CONCLUSION

Simple Rules for a Complex World has received a lot of attention. Given the quirks and vulnerabilities in Epstein's arguments,
one might wonder why the book has caught the popular eye. In the
New York Times Book Review, Nathan Glazer declares: "[A]t the
very least Mr. Epstein has to be taken seriously, and not only because of the power of his reasoning and his authoritative command
of the common law and political philosophy," but also because his
proposals "turn out to have much more political life in them than
one could have thought possible. '23 The Wall Street Journal's reviewer, John H. Fund, writes: "Mr. Epstein's relentlessly logical arguments tell us why we should return to the tried-and-true rules of
the common law." 24 The legal press also has been kind and attentive to Simple Rules. Writing in the ABA Journal, Paul Reidinger
calls the book "intellectually attractive," although he ultimately
concludes that simple rules are practically unworkable in a complex
world. 2 Otto Obermaier, reviewing Simple Rules for the New York
Law Journal,is more wholeheartedly complimentary:
This is a seminal and timely book by a controversial theorist. The
Congress and two best sellers, To Renew America by Newt Gingrich
and The Death of Common Sense by Philip Howard, bruit what
amount of law and regulation is best. But they lack the type of intellectual infrastructure that Simple Rules for a Complex World provides
for the proposition that less is better.26
As I have tried to demonstrate, Simple Rules is not "relentlessly
logical," nor does it represent the common law as it now stands, nor
does it provide firm intellectual infrastructure for the positions it
espouses. So what are we to make of these reviews? Why is Simple
Rules getting extensive attention and a warm reaction?
The answers to these questions lie, I think, in the book's political resonance. Certainly Professor Epstein's prominent position
within the American legal academy also plays a role. Conservative
23. Nathan Glazer, The Law is a Mess, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1995, § 7, at 3 (book review).
24. John H. Fund, Common-Law Common Sense, WALL ST. J., May 30, 1995, at A12
(book review).
25. See Paul Reidinger, Six Degrees of Regulation, A.B.A. J., May 1995, at 101 (book
review).
26. Otto G. Obermaier, The Lawyer's Bookshelf Simple Rules for a Complex World, 214
N.Y. LJ., Aug. 22, 1995, at 2 (book review).
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American politicians can and have turned to Epstein's work to lend
scholarly weight

-

and therefore credibility -

to their political

agenda. Liberals such as Senator Joseph Biden have recognized the
political significance of Epstein's work to the conservative movement. During Clarence Thomas's confirmation hearings, Biden
claimed that anyone who endorsed Takings: Private Property and
the Power of Eminent Domain (an earlier Epstein book that lays the
foundation for the first-possession and take-and-pay rules adopted
in the current volume) was unfit to serve on the Supreme Court.2 7
Biden's rhetoric reveals the political force Epstein's work tends to
have.
Like Takings, Simple Rules bolsters American political conservatism, regardless of the soundness of the arguments Epstein
presents. The book has rhetorical power. Its very title plays upon
the current cultural yearning for simplicity, even though the legal
regime proposed is not in fact simple in any usual sense of that
term. The seven "simple rules" articulate a position with intuitive
appeal to those citizens who dislike government regulation or fed28
eral taxation whatever the reasons for their opposition.
Those of us who favor a more activist government - for
whatever reasons - must acknowledge the political force of Simple
Rules, but, more important, we also must develop equally politically
compelling arguments for our position. It would be especially nice
if those arguments -not only carried political resonance but also
were intellectually sound.

27. See id.
28. Typically, these reasons are not rooted in commitments to libertarian or utilitarian
ideals.

